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Introduction
 The visible condition of a person in bodily pain or of a person who has lost 
autonomy, social status or self–representation, reveals to some degree an in-
visible reality which is present in every human being. In other words, in the 
encounter with a marginal, dependent, sick or disabled person, moral judge-
ments based on the idea of independence and autonomy are often revealed 
to be illusions, challenged by the idea of dependent, deeply vulnerable and 
limited creatures.1
Assuming the validity of this premise, my primary purpose in the fol-
lowing paper is first to reflect upon social and cultural attitudes that con-
sider disability and vulnerability as a boundary and a threat; and secondly, 
to propose an alternative in transgressing the differences of socio — anthro-
pological boundaries in order to enable dynamic communication with fel-
low human beings, and ultimately, to bring about true human flourishing.
In the first part of this paper I will reflect upon the meaning of disability, 
as well as, the impact that the presence of those living with disability has 
on individuals and society at large. In such perspective, particular emphasis 
laid upon the physical condition of those living with disability. In the sec-
ond part, my focus will be on the meaning of vulnerability associated with, 
but distinct from the notion of disability. Thirdly, I will elucidate my argu-
ment with concrete examples from the L´Arche community — where people 
with and without disabilities are living together in mutual interdependency 
and cooperation.
*  Martina Vuk, E–Mail: martina.vuk@unifr.ch, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland & FNS 
— Doc.Mobility, Fellow, University of Aberdeen, UK.
1 John Swinton, Becoming Friends of Time: Disability, Timefulness, and Gentle Discipleship 
(Texas, Baylor  University Press, 2016).
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1. What is disability? 
Definitions of disability2 depend on whether disability is approached from 
the realm of biomedical or social sciences. Numerous definitions of disabil-
ity have been proposed in an academic framework within the last fifty years 
stemming from medical through to a social definition. According to a recent 
World Health Organization (WHO) definition — also used in our European 
context — disability is considered an umbrella term that covers impair-
ments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions.3 Disability is thus 
not just a health problem, it is a complex phenomenon reflecting the interac-
tion between features of a person’s body and features of the society in which 
he or she lives. Overcoming the difficulties faced by people with disability, 
requires interventions to remove environmental and social barriers. When 
approaching disability discourses from the scope of Disability studies,4 two 
dominant models5 are discussed: the biomedical and social model. Those 
two models have been largely influential in framing the definition of dis-
ability, as presented above. The biomedical model, on the one hand, looks 
at disability as a physical condition and individual tragedy that needs to be 
fixed or cured by medical intervention. The social model, on the other hand, 
emerged as a reaction to the biomedical model in the early 1970s. Its primar-
ily focus is on “fixing” societal attitudes towards disabled people, instead 
2 In this paper, my reflection does not include a particular type of disability, such as se-
vere, developmental or intellectual. I will use them interchangebly. My emphasis is to 
illuminate an interdisciplinary conceptual and cultural comprehension of disability un-
derstood within the context of mainstrem society. For a more robust comprehension and 
classification of disability see: World Health Organisation, World Report on Disability, (Ge-
neva: World Health Organisation, 2011), available from http: // www.who.int / disabilities/
world_report/2011 /report.pdf ; World Health Organisation, International Classification of 
Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF), (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2001), avail-
able from http://www.who.int/classifications/icf/en/; See also “Definition on Developmen-
tal and Intellectual Disability,” American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disability (AAIDD), available from http://aaidd.org/home
3 See “Disabilities,” World Health Organisation, accessed April 2017, available from http: // 
www.who.int/ topics/disabilities/en/ 
4 According to one of its proponents and as a person with direct experience of impairment, 
Simi Linton defines Disability studies as the socio–political–cultural model of disability 
incarnate. It provides an epistemology of inclusion and integration, formulating ideas that 
could not have been imagined from the restrictive thresholds of the traditional cannon. 
See Simi Linton, “Disability Studies/Not Disability Studies,” Disability&Society, Vol. 13, 
no.4.,1998.
5 Alongside two dominant models of disability, there are few other approaches to disability 
such as: radical model (Whithers, 2012); human rights model, (UN, 2006); or few versions 
of social model such as British Social Model, (Campbell&Oliver,1998; Barnes&Mercer, 
2010); the North American minority approach (Scotch, 1984); the Nordic relational model 
(Tøssebro 2002, 2004); postmodernist disability approach (Corker&Shakespeare, 2002), 
etc. 
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of looking on disability as physical impairment. This is to say that for the 
social model it is society that oppresses people with disabilities by disabling 
their potential and participation within society, whereas for the biomedical 
model disability represents a bodily condition called physical impairment 
which became a plea for medical intervention. Although the two models are 
rather separated, my suggestion is that in order to establish a holistic under-
standing of disability, both models — biomedical and social — need to be in-
tegrated, yet distinguished. Speaking of disability as a physical impairment, 
for instance, disability indeed presents a personal or interior boundary to 
those with disabilities in performing daily tasks, and in communicating or 
engaging with a “proper” level of social functioning. Likewise, disability as 
visible condition can also present an unpleasant condition and create hos-
tile attitudes from society and culture towards those living with disabilities. 
In the first case, it is an individual interior condition of disability such as 
chronic pain, lack of access or communication that creates a difficulty for 
the individual. In the second example, it is the society whose attitudes to-
wards disability, for them, disables people with disability on a larger scale 
by denying their proper inclusion and participation as fellow human beings 
equal in rights and dignity.
1.1. Disability, culture, theology
On the cultural level, with a great effort of social activism there has been 
unprecedented receptivity towards disability in the modern period. Thanks 
to the social model definition of disability, which has a broader applica-
tion within social policies for the disabled, persons have generally become 
less isolated by being further included in broader society. With the progress 
of modern medicine many people with disabilities, especially those with 
Down Syndrome, will experience, as never before, so many benefits with a 
modern way of practicing medicine.6 However, the persistent problem with 
a western liberal society regarding disability is that people with disability 
are reduced to the acquisition of rights and freedoms. Although people with 
disability nowadays can experience inclusion, they do not necessarily feel 
that they belong or are desired as potential friends, companions or employ-
ees. To truly belong one needs to be missed. As theologian John Swinton 
wrote: “belonging goes deeper than inclusion, since to belong one needs 
6 For instance, in an American study on disability the findings of Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation in 2003 and 2004 have shown that a majority (82%) people with disability 
surveyed in a report, think they have better lives today than they had some years ago. 
However, almost 40% believed that the health care system treats persons with physical 
disability unfairly. See “Americans’ Views of Disability. A Kaiser Health Poll Report 2004.” 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, accessed Mai 2015, available from https://www.kff.org
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to be truly seen as one self, while to be included, persons just need to be 
present in order that the system conform one to some kind of relational, 
social or legal norm.”7 This raises the question: are people with disabili-
ties truly acknowledged as missing within society? The significance of such 
openness is undermined by evidence of different opinions in academia and 
in practice (conceptually and socially) regarding the meaning of disability, 
which reinforces a divisive and discriminatory approach to a person with 
disability. Conceiving of disability per se and as a concept, as a painful and 
isolated human existence, in my observation, creates four principal difficul-
ties. First, it establishes a boundary line of interaction between the disabled 
and the “non–disabled,” based upon the fear of interaction and the struggle 
to encounter the disabled as other, equal in rights and dignity. I call this the 
psychological stigma impacted by fear and separation. Second, it creates an 
assumption that the disabled ought to be cured and made normal. Such at-
titudes reflect the tendency towards individual / biomedical model and nor-
mality. The third temptation, as theologian Pia Matthews wrote, is perhaps 
the one that links disabled children with angelic appearances (or angels) as 
if they do not quite belong in the earthly realm.8 This I call the disembodi-
ment and spiritualization of disabled people. The fourth difficulty when 
speaking about disability is that encounter with disabled person (as this has 
been the case in the past, and still continues) provokes within mainstream 
society the feeling of pity and charity. This has been evident within the 
scope of social and charitable organizations including the framework of the 
preferential option of the poor within the catholic Church.
Disability certainly provokes society into displaying a particularly nega-
tive and impersonal reaction towards those who live with it. These reactions 
and stereotypes make it extremely difficult for people to find and maintain 
positive interpersonal relationships — an important source of value and 
self–esteem available to everyone. 
Regarding the context of the experience of disability, I would suggest 
that the real question is not whether disability is a social or medical condi-
tion, or what cultural images it inflicts, but whether the encounter with a 
person with disability can be an encounter with a true and different other, 
equal in dignity and rights, without falling into categorization?
Remedying this situation requires an open approach to elucidate a 
proper understanding of disability, and more profoundly, a commitment to 
explore what it means to be human. The theological quest of disability as 
7 John Swinton, “From Inclusion to Belonging: A Practical Theology of Community, Disabil-
ity and Humanness”  Journal of Religion, Disability and Health. Vol. 16, 2, 2012., p. 184
8 Pia Matthews, Pope John Paul II and the Apparently “Non–acting“Person (Gracewing: Her-
efordshire, 2013) p. 164.
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Stanley Hauerwas addresses, is not only what theologians or society can do 
about disable people within society, but why society perceives disability 
as a problem or an ethical dilemma in the first place.9 This means that dis-
ability is not merely a concept that must be discussed, and neither is it the 
condition that requires charity, but it is a theo–anthropological quest that 
requires a proper reflection of what it means to be made in the image of God 
and how those whose bodily or rational capacities are lower fit into such a 
framework. 
According to a Christian understanding, being made in the image of God 
does not explicitly imply having the capacity for rational endeavor or func-
tion as ‘normal’ in terms of modern mainstream projection of normality. The 
image of God is a deeper category where the relational, preceding the ra-
tional, is perceived as a persons´ capacity to participate in relational charity 
with God and other human fellows. This entails that persons with disability 
as with any other non — disabled person should be respected in their dig-
nity and freedom before being regarded as an object of charitable activity, 
altruism or moral “obligation.” The body and the person belong together and 
both are called in the human being to imitate Christ. Thus, the discourses on 
disability not only opens up an important debate within the field of theologi-
cal anthropology but requires a comprehension of a distinction between dis-
ability as a concept or condition from the person that lives with disability. In 
other words, as a condition, disability presents certain challenges that affect 
a person´s capacity and ability, but the person with disability is not merely 
her/his disability neither is the person without disability explicitly valued ac-
cording to his/her ability. My suggestion is that it is not merely disability that 
needs to be transgressed or overcome, but rather the mainstream attitudes 
towards disability — that close up in fear and isolation or a feeling of pity 
and charity, and consequently mark people with disability as vulnerable and 
dependent.
2. Vulnerability — common and invisible aspect of
 humanness?
This leads us towards the second notion that requires reflection within the 
scope of this paper — the notion of vulnerability. For the most of history, dis-
ability as a condition has been associated with the meaning of vulnerability 
and stigma. In forms of legal or socio — political language people with dis-
ability are frequently situated under the category of vulnerable individuals. 
9 Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally 
Handicapped and  the Church (University of Notre Dame Press: IL,1986). 
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This has been evident in many international documents including the Unit-
ed Nations Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (art. 8);10 
the Document on Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (CIOMS, 
2010);11 and the most recent one, the Report of the International Bioethics 
Committee of UNESCO on the Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability 
and Personal Integrity (IBC, 2013).12 
What about other people? Does vulnerability as a condition also include 
“the category of normal” or people without disability? 
Disability does indeed imply personal vulnerability, as people with dis-
ability (with profound or severe disabilities, respectively) do need more at-
tention, affection, understanding and love. However, people with disability 
cannot be identified or reduced to the meaning of vulnerability as one group 
of vulnerable individuals, neither can the mainstream population be de-
prived of the experience of vulnerability. As humans we all are vulnerable, 
but at the same time we all are autonomous. The real question is what does 
autonomy precisely mean and why within the modern moral discourse has 
it been the dominant idea regarding the meaning of being human? The em-
phasis upon autonomy understood as the capacity of being a self–dependent 
or rationally powerful creature obscures the recognition of vulnerability as 
being equally important and constitutive for the realization of human. Vul-
nerability became a mark of women and children, as well as, the marginal, 
weak, sick and disabled individuals. Until recently, the meaning of vulner-
ability was emphasized as a mark of those individuals who are particularly 
affected by greater bodily vulnerabilities such as people with intellectual 
disabilities and mental disorders, people with Alzheimer disease or any 
other individuals whose cognitive abilities are diminished. For this reason, 
I suggest we take a look at the semantics of the term vulnerability and sec-
ondly, on its application within the field of academia. 
In the contemporary discourse the meaning of vulnerability is often re-
placed with the meaning of fragility, weakness and suffering. Although the 
distinction between the three meanings is subtle, there is an obvious con-
ceptual difference between the abovementioned terms. Vulnerability is not 
merely the capacity to be wounded, weak and fragile as most relevant dic-
10 See United Nations, Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal Integrity, (Paris, UN-
ESCO, 2005),  Article 8., accessed February, 2014, available from http://portal.unesco.org/
en/ev.php URL_ID = 31058&URL  DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
11 See CIOMS, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects, (Geneva, WHO, 2010), assessed March,2014, available from http: //www.recerca.
uab.es/ceeah  /docs/CIOMS.pdf., assessed March,2014.
12 United Nations, Report of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of Unesco on 
the Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal Integrity, (Paris, UN-
ESCO, 2013), accessed August, 2017, available from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0018/001895/189591e.pdf.
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tionaries will describe it. Neither is it a tragic condition of illness and suffer-
ing, which has been reflected within various contemporary discourses. Yet, 
it is a complex and controversial term which require proper clarification. 
Besides acknowledging vulnerability as the capacity to be wounded, The 
Dictionnaire Encyclopédique D´Ethique Chretienne13 defines vulnerability 
as a form or mode of human existence embedded in vitality, sensitivity and 
sociability. The present dictionary also acknowledges vulnerability as a phe-
nomenon that manifests itself through sad emotions (anxieties, despair and 
dislike) in periods of insecurity, violence, or death. In her book La vulnéra-
bilité une nouvelle catégorie morale?14 Swiss philosopher Nathalie Maillard 
addresses vulnerability as a term relevant to living beings as their ontologi-
cal category which by nature of things per se, constitutes an essential part of 
their existence. It is important to emphasize that according to Maillard defi-
nition, although all living beings are substantially vulnerable, not all have 
the same intensity of vulnerability. There are people who are more vulner-
able (for instance people with disability) and people who react differently 
on vulnerability. This means that we cannot make a categorical distinction 
between vulnerable and non–vulnerable individuals, but between more or 
less vulnerable people. 
 The second issue I would like to emphasize regarding vulnerability is 
its implications and understanding within academic disciplines. Within the 
scope of academia, the most recent ethical, philosophical and theological 
discourses have shown that vulnerability can be approached from various 
perspectives and dimensions. The medical approach seemingly locates the 
notion of vulnerability within the notion of disease — corporeal and bio-
logical susceptibility. In bioethical discourses, priority has been given to the 
discussion regarding the relation between the concerns of autonomy and 
vulnerability15 and as a reaction to medical and technological power and 
control. 
In the context of social philosophy, the notion is that vulnerability im-
plies social, environmental, political and economic individual disadvan-
tages, such as malnutrition, migration, poverty, abuse, etc. The philosophi-
cal and theological literature distinguishes vulnerability as an ontological 
condition, anthropologically conceptualized within the context of life ex-
perience, and discussed as a mutual human and a human — Divine inter-
13 Laurent, L., Gaziaux E., Müller D., “Vulnérabilite.” Dictionnaire Encyclopédique D´Ethique 
Chretienne. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 2013.
14 Nathalie Maillard, La vulnérabilité une nouvelle catégorie morale? (Genève: Labor et Fides, 
2011), p. 161– 228.
15 See Barry Hoffmaster, “What does vulnerability mean?,” Hasting Center Report, 36, no. 
2, (2006); Michael  H.Kottow. “The vulnerable and the Susceptible,” Bioethics, 17 no.5 
(2003).
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dependence.16 Following such propositions, my further focus concerns the 
relational aspect of vulnerability, as a theo–anthropological concept, and ac-
knowledges vulnerability as a human condition given to all, and not merely 
to people with disability. This entails that, anthropologically conceptual-
ized, vulnerability signifies an aspect of weakness, relationality and depend-
ency. As a theological construct, it also connotes openness, relationship, 
dependency, belonging and flourishing. 
Speaking about vulnerability as risk and openness, Thierry Collaud uses 
the open arms metaphor in Miroslav Volf´s, Exclusion and Embrace17. In 
the gesture of open arms, Collaud sees a reciprocal process of being open 
towards the other who presents vulnerability. In accepting vulnerability (or 
the other), the boundary between the self and the other becomes porous, not 
as the power that breaks the boundaries of the other and forces the fulfill-
ment of desire, but as a self–giving risk in this interval where the self awaits 
the other’s answer, never being certain of it, as the other cannot be coerced 
or manipulated into an embrace.18 
The theologian Thomas Reynolds rightly observes that emphasizing the 
aspects such as rational autonomy, independency, strength and individual-
ism, the Enlightenment’s anthropology fails to recognize the proper value of 
human integrity and, related to this, vulnerability.19 
Highlighting a close link between Enlightenment premises (rational au-
tonomy, freedom, independence and equality) and principles of liberalism 
(voluntarism, egalitarianism and individualism), Reynolds insist that the 
structures of liberal democracy, facilitate the foundation of the framework 
of the cult of normalcy, which became hostile towards vulnerability and 
disability.20 
The modern comprehension of autonomy is therefore measured accord-
ing to a person´s rational and cognitive capacities with a strong emphasis on 
self–determination. This to some extent does not merely derive from the ex-
clusive behavior of individuals with diminished rational capacities or those 
whose quantitative intelligence quotient fall below 75 I.Q., but derives from 
a rather unfortunate formulation of the notion of autonomy. This leads to the 
16 Martina Vuk, “Vulnerability and Disability: Ethical and Theological Evaluation“, Unpub-
lished Research Master Thesis, KU Leuven, 2014.
17 See Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace:A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness 
and Reconciliation, (Nashville, Abingdon Press,1996), p. 99–166.
18 Thierry Collaud. “La vulnérabilité nécessaire au bien commun,” (paper presented at Col-
loque International Personne vulnérable et société de performance, Institut Interdiscipli-
naire d’Ethique et des Droits de l’Homme, Université de Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland, 
April 2 2014).
19 Thomas  Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2008).
20 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, p.78–80.
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premise that not only vulnerability and autonomy need better interrelation, 
but as MacIntyre suggested, for an adequately balanced approach to the per-
son, the strict separation between the two concepts, reveals the insufficient 
understanding of interdependency in the modern evaluation of the meaning 
of human person. As he puts it: 
“Modern moral philosophy has understandably and rightly placed great em-
phasis upon individual autonomy, upon the capacity for making independent 
choices. Virtues of independent rational agency need for their adequate exercise 
to be accompanied by what I shall call the virtues of acknowledged dependence 
and that a failure to understand this is apt to obscure some features of rational 
agency.”21
Theologically speaking, vulnerability does not present an evil or tragic 
condition, but indicates the existential limits of earthly creatures, their in-
terdependency, and a possibility for love. 
Being made in the image of God, as indicated earlier, implies that there 
is a capacity to love in a charitable relationship and is inclusive of all people 
whatever their intellectual capacities. The intellect, as a theological aspect, 
does not represent a corporeal organ, and neither is mental capacity meas-
ured by its I.Q. or ability for self — determination, but is determined by its 
distinctive human character. I would further add that being human equally 
implies the capacity of being vulnerable and dependent on God and fel-
low humans, not as something tragic, but as a possibility for growth in and 
through relationships. 
3.  L´Arche — an example of Christian counterculture 
In this section I will elucidate my argument by offering concrete examples 
of the story of the L´Arche community where people with and without dis-
abilities are living together as friends and brothers. Such interactions imply 
mutual dependency that acknowledge each person´ s weakness and unique-
ness not as something separated, but accepted and celebrated. In 2016, I 
interviewed a man named Brent22 who has been a friend for a long time with 
a person with disability in one of the L´Arche communities in England. In 
answering a question regarding what characterizes this friendship relation-
ship, Brent replied: 
“this friendship was a place where I could feel well, the place where I could be 
vulnerable; it helps me to discover that people could be my friend for reasons 
that were not mutual interest and mutual strengths, so this friendship brought 
21 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues 
(London: Gerald Duckworth & Co.Ltd., 1999), p. 8.
22 In order to protect participant privacy, the given names are changed.
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me to love myself with weaknesses and imperfection and to be happy with 
this.”23
In his answer, Brent points to a few key issues regarding the complex-
ity of the ideas associated with the notion of vulnerability. First, Brent was 
a friend with a person with disability — a person whose vulnerability is 
(as we could assume) greater that Brent’s. Second, the vulnerability of that 
person could possibly challenge Brent and expose his vulnerability. Third, 
approaching his condition as mature and responsible person, he uses terms 
such as vulnerability, weakness, and imperfection. And fourth, addressing 
the vulnerability and weakness as parts of his human condition and part 
of his friendship relationship does not stop him from flourishing (“to be 
happy”).
As a Christian counterculture — founded by the 2015 Templeton Prize 
winner, Jean Vanier — L´Arche is a global network of communities of people 
with and without disability that has been a witness of a way of “transcend-
ing the barriers” between different people who live together as friends and 
companions for more than fifty years. Grounded in Christian principles, 
but explicitly multicultural and interfaith in operation, L´Arche attempts 
to demonstrate the possibility of living by alternative values. Among other 
aspects, L´Arche offers an alternative way of seeing the truth of disability. It 
is not disability as the condition per se, but the encounter with a person with 
disability that counts as central and authentic. Such an encounter changes 
how one regards the personhood and moral agency of those living with dis-
ability. The relationships within the context of L´Arche are relationships 
that are marked by disparity in mental capacity, in the capacity to perform 
certain activities, and by different social status, cultures and religions. Yet, 
these relationships flourish. Such relationships portray diversity as an es-
sential element of transformative friendships. Moreover, the relationships 
in L´Arche are characterized by a particular way of belonging that implies 
interdependency, the main features of which are a narrative of vulnerability 
and individual uniqueness. The outcome of this interdependent relation-
ship is transformation of a person’s perception of and relation to the other, 
openness towards the other and mutual acceptance of one´s own personal 
limits not as something tragic but as a way to transcend one´s own self–suf-
ficiency. Such communication and relationship has been proof demanding 
for mainstream society; however, it remains an opportunity to reconsider 
and transcend differences.
23 First name, Last name of interviewee (Exploring Friendship Relationship between People 
with and without Disabilities in context of L´Arche), interviewed by Martina Vuk, Man-
chester, England, November, 2015,transcript Martina Vuk, Université de Fribourg, Switzer-
land.
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Conclusion
as a point of conclusion, the encounter with the person who is fragile or dif-
ferent in terms of mental capacity, social status, culture and religion — such 
as, for instance, persons with disability, with Alzheimer’s, with dementia, or 
who are homeless and strangers — could be the mediator of an achievement 
of true freedom and an opening towards a true knowledge of one — self and 
the other. The visible vulnerability of those ostensibly more vulnerable, re-
veals the invisible and hidden vulnerability of every human being and has a 
potential to release one — self from the captivation of false prejudices, fears 
and self–sufficiency.
I assume that the fundamental challenge in overcoming the fear of differ-
ence does not lie in other persons, a political system, a Church or a culture, 
but rather in insisting on the individuals´ invulnerability, false self — image 
and self–sufficiency, that places barriers in the way of human communica-
tion and communion. In this regard, an anthropology founded upon recogni-
tion of vulnerability can confront cultural inconsistencies and reveal to the 
Church and society the possibilities for appreciating the dynamic diversity 
of the human condition. Thus, taking this positive approach, the concepts of 
disability, and relatedly human vulnerability, are not only to be understood 
as an exposure to suffering but also as the surrender of oneself in trust to the 
other and to the world.To transgress boundaries of difference that disability 
as a visible condition of some places in front of us, requires acceptance of 
our vulnerable human condition not as something tragic, but as a strength 
and possibility that lead us towards the other. In such exchange, the other 
is perceived both as a gift and a creature with the capacity to be limited and 
vulnerable, but simultaneously unique and autonomous in trust and dignity.
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Abstract
DISABILITY AND VULNERABILITY — IMPEDIMENTS OR 
POSSIBILITIES?
A Hypothesis from the scope of social Christian ethics
The visible condition of a person in bodily pain or of a person who has lost au-
tonomy, social status or self–representation, reveals to some degree an invisible 
reality which is present in every human being. Assuming the validity of this 
premise, my primary purpose in the following paper is first to reflect upon social 
and cultural attitudes that consider disability and vulnerability as a boundary 
and a threat; and secondly, to propose an alternative in transgressing the differ-
ences of socio — anthropological boundaries in order to enable dynamic com-
munication with fellow human beings, and ultimately, to bring about the true 
human flourishing. The structure of my argument is threefold. In a first part 
my focus is stressed upon concerns of those living with a physical condition 
of disability and a mainstream socio–cultural attitudes towards it. In the sec-
ond part, my attention will be on the meaning of vulnerability associated with, 
but distinct from the notion of disability. Thirdly, I will elucidate my argument 
with concrete examples from the L´Arche community — where people with and 
without disabilities are living together in mutual interdependency and coopera-
tion.
KEY WORDS: disability, vulnerability, self–sufficiency, L´Arche, interdependency
